new york timesCharles Blow, one of the most progressive columnists, recently published a brief op-ed arguing that America will be looking at a repeat of the 1968 presidential election as anti-war protests divide the Democratic Party.
Of course, history does not literally repeat itself. Specific events, situations, and figures are not repeated in the same form. Every historical event is the product of a unique context.
That is, patterns, themes, and dynamics can and often do reemerge across different time periods. Comparable conditions tend to produce similar results.
We can point out that there are numerous dramatic differences between 1968 and 2024. The protests are neither aimed at the Democratic president nor attracting large swaths of young people. No major politician was assassinated, sparking disillusionment and publicity. There has yet to be an urban uprising like the one sparked by the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. The United States is not at war per se.
Still, there are some eerie similarities between 2024 and 1968. These include deep divisions within the Democratic Party, a highly polarized political environment, and highly visible and highly publicized protests. There has also been a series of events that have had a significant impact on the country's sense of security and well-being, including the pandemic, issues of racial discrimination, a surge in post-COVID-19 inflation, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Additionally, there is a presidential candidate running on a “law and order” platform and a third-party candidate who could potentially take votes away from one of the major parties and help decide the election.
The 2024 presidential election may be decided by indifference rather than activism, resignation or inevitability rather than anger and resentment. Time will tell. However, awareness of the past must serve as a warning sign.
One widely repeated historical metaphor is that America is in the midst of a new Gilded Age, drawing parallels between the current socioeconomic and political environment and the late 19th century. Both eras experienced rapid technological innovation and economic growth. Both were characterized by extreme inequality and monopolistic and oligopolistic business practices. What Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner described in their 1873 book seems to be true today. That is, a superficial layer of gold that obscures deeper problems of social inequality and moral corruption.
At the heart of the metaphor is the notion that American society today faces many of the same problems that plagued the country in the past. These include significant disparities in income and wealth, the excessive influence of large corporations and the ultra-rich on politics and policy, and incredibly rapid technological change. This combines with an insurrectionary populism that threatens existing jobs, a bitter struggle between capital and labor, deep cultural divisions, strong anti-immigrant sentiment, and challenges existing political norms.
Not only can these metaphors be found in social and political commentary, but they have also been embraced by policy advocates and even scholars who study the dynamics of democracy, capitalism, race and inequality in this country.
Historical analogies don't just plague historians. Historical analogies play an important role in shaping policy decisions because policymakers look to past events to understand current issues and predict the consequences of decisions. By drawing parallels between previous and current situations, leaders can justify actions, persuade stakeholders, and frame policy choices. But the use of historical analogies also carries risks. This is because oversimplified or incorrect similarities lead to incorrect judgments.
Here is a concrete example of how historical analogies have influenced policy.
For many foreign policy hawks, that year will always be 1938. Perhaps the most frequently cited historical analogy is the Munich Agreement. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain often cited Adolf Hitler's policy of appeasement toward Germany to argue against negotiations with the invaders. During the Cold War, American leaders often invoked Munich to justify their hard-line stance against the Soviet Union, arguing that negotiation or the emergence of weakness would only encourage more attacks.
Likewise, the analogy has been applied to situations involving North Korea and Iran's nuclear programs, with leaders arguing that concessions could further embolden those regimes.
Conversely, in foreign policy, the Vietnam War served as a warning about the dangers of American military intervention and nation-building abroad. Especially at the risk of being locked in an unwinnable war over a long period of time, or because the United States doesn't really understand the region.
This bogged down analogy has been frequently cited during the debate surrounding U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Critics of these wars have warned that, as in Vietnam, the United States could enter a conflict without clear goals or exit strategies, potentially resulting in significant casualties, unexpected costs, and political fallout.
The success of the Marshall Plan in helping rebuild Europe after World War II highlights the potential benefits of investing in post-conflict reconstruction and economic development in war-torn countries, or investing domestically to solve pressing domestic problems. It is often used as a metaphor for .
This analogy influenced the U.S. approach to rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan, with proponents arguing that significant investments in rebuilding infrastructure and institutions could stabilize these countries and promote democracy. However, differences in historical context, political dynamics, and social structures between post-World War II Europe and modern conflict zones make the applicability of this analogy difficult.
During the Cold War, the domino theory assumed that if a country fell to communism, communism would spread throughout the region. This theory was used to justify U.S. intervention in Vietnam and other parts of Southeast Asia, under the belief that stopping the spread of communism in Vietnam was essential to preventing its spread throughout Asia. This metaphor influenced the broader policy of suppressing communism through military intervention, economic support, and political alliances.
A widely circulated historical analogy today is between the Axis powers of World War II (Germany, Italy, and Japan) and the so-called Axis of Resistance (Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea). This analogy is interesting, but should not be accepted without careful consideration.
Those who accept this analogy help the United States understand the challenges the new axis poses to global stability and geopolitical structures and norms and the strategic response it requires from Western democracies.
Like the Axis powers of World War II, the new Axis powers share a common stance of opposition to the Western-led international order. Alliances in both eras were formed not by shared ideology but by strategic expediency to offset the influence of dominant powers.
Both alliances sought to expand their influence through aggressive actions. Axis powers used military means, while modern states sought to expand their influence using a mix of military, cyber, economic, and political means.
But historical differences should not be minimized. Despite their disagreements, the Axis powers were more ideologically aligned in their fascist and imperialist goals than the now disparate groups of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, whose motivations ranged from regional domination to ideological survival.
The Axis powers of World War II were a formal military alliance with the explicit goal of territorial expansion and the establishment of a new world order under their control. Currently, relations between Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea are more fluid. It is characterized by cooperation in certain areas, but is not a formal alliance for a single, unified goal.
Equally important, the global situation today is dramatically different from that of the 1930s and early 1940s. Today's world is far more interconnected and interdependent than it was during World War II. The presence of nuclear weapons further complicates the dynamics of international conflict.
Although there are superficial similarities in the nature of these alliances and their opposition to the dominant global order, significant differences in ideological coherence, global context, nature of alliances, and global interdependence make simple analogies problematic.
Historical analogies can provide insight into contemporary challenges, but they must be used with caution, recognizing the unique aspects of the current international environment. The analogy between the Axis powers of World War II and the modern informal alliance between Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea emphasizes the importance of strategic vigilance and cooperation between democracies to maintain international order, but it also highlights the need for nuanced diplomacy in complex and complex situations. I emphasize. An interconnected world.
Historical analogies are a double-edged sword in policy making. These comparisons provide a framework for understanding and action, but they must be used with caution to avoid the pitfalls of misunderstanding and oversimplification. Too often, these metaphors constrain the imagination of policymakers, leading to rigid or stereotyped responses. Effective use of historical analogies requires awareness of important differences between historical and current contexts and a critical evaluation of the lessons learned from history.
Historical analogies are fascinating and dangerous because history resonates. Yes, we must keep an eye on the rear-view mirror as we move forward, and we must always remember that drawing historical parallels is an art, not a science.