Some federal criminal laws require a male domain called “corrupt.” What does “corrupt” mean? In both cases of this term, the Supreme Court has avoided clearly defining this mental state.
28 USC § 1512(c)(2), the statute at issue. Fisher v. United StatesWe provide:
(c) Whoever corrupts –
(1) Altering, destroying, mutilating, or concealing, or attempting to do so, any record, document, or other object with the intent to impair the integrity or availability of such object for use in official proceedings; or
(2) Other cases that interfere with, influence, delay, or attempt to do so, official proceedings.
Under this law, you can be fined, imprisoned for up to 20 years, or both.
many Fisher We discussed whether the word “otherwise” limits the offense in (c)(2) to the type of offense in (c)(1). The majority opinion, delivered by Chief Justice Roberts, held that (c)(1) limited (c)(2), and that the latter was not a “catch-all” provision for all other obstruction offenses. Justice Barrett's dissenting opinion rejected that interpretation. Justice Jackson made a perhaps surprising vote, joining the majority opinion. However, Jackson drafted a separate motion that distanced itself from what could be said to be the original meaning of the law and instead sought to determine legislative intent.
Who guessed? To use loafer bright As a model, what is the “best” interpretation of a statute? And we know that there can be only one “best” interpretation of a statute. This is a tough case. In the lower courts, I was persuaded by Justice Katsas's dissent, which Chief Justice Roberts repeatedly relied on. Still, I found parts of Justice Barrett's analysis compelling. Despite all my criticisms of Barrett's background as a law professor (and others have made similar points), she shines on the issue of statutory interpretation. This kind of case should be in every statutory interpretation casebook. Barrett's discussion of the hypothetical statute, and her response to the Chief Justice's zoo and football analogies, were very sharp. Overall, I think this is a close call. I can hear Justice Gorsuch screaming “the rule of tolerance” in his head, so he'll probably rule in favor of the defendant here. But the part I'm interested in here is the “mens rea” part of the statute, which didn't directly affect the court's decision.
Section 1512(c) applies only to persons who take the prescribed action “corruptly.” What does corrupt mean? Judge really They don't want to tell us.
Chief Justice Roberts explains that the government does not provide a specific definition of corruption in the statute.
But the government acknowledges that “Congress did not ‘corruptly’ define the purpose of Section 1512.” Id., at 44. And although the government suggests that “corrupt” is “'generally associated with conduct that is unjust, immoral, depraved, or evil,'” ibid. (quoting Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 US 696, 705 (2005)), “Knowing that we”[ing] “intimidation” or “threat”[s]”It is not “wrong” to say “to someone” §1512(b).
It is difficult to define “corruptly” as simply “wrong.” Then the word “corruptly” doesn't add anything to the equation. All of the acts listed in 1512 (altering, destroying, disrupting, etc.) are wrong. The mens rea element must explain the defendant's state of mind when he committed the act. And the word “immoral” depends on some concept of morality. Can the government ban immoral behavior? United States v. Windsor and Overgeppel vs Hodges? The court has firmly ruled that “moral condemnation” is not a reasonable basis for state action. I do not believe that the government can criminalize an act simply because it deems it “immoral.”
We are left with the words “corrupt” and “evil.” Neither of these words, I think, do a good job of describing what “corrupt” generally means. You can be evil without engaging in corruption. Even supervillains can act honestly and uprightly. And you can be corrupt without being evil. Charities can bribe government officials for grants so they can perform important public services. “Corrupt” and “evil” seem like separate concepts.
In the lower court, Chief Justice Roberts cited Justice Walker's definition of “corruption.”
Justice Walker agreed in part, because he read the statute's mens rea element as requiring the defendant to act “corruptly” and with “the intent to obtain an illicit gain,” and agreed with the judgment. Id., at 361 (internal quotation marks omitted).
This sense of “spoilingly” embraces a certain kind of self-enrichment. Imagine that a government official receives a briefcase full of cash in exchange for taking official action. The person receiving the bribe, i.e. something for something– Perhaps you have a “corrupt” mental state.
The majority relies on the uncertainty of “corruptly” to argue that the government’s interpretation of the statute is too broad. In particular, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that §1512(c)(2) could be used to “sentence activists and lobbyists alike to prison for decades.” The Solicitor General conceded that “under the government’s interpretation, a peaceful protester could be prosecuted under §1512(c)(2) and sentenced to 20 years in prison if she acted “corruptly.” And if “corruptly” simply meant “wrong,” such a prosecution would not be difficult.
In opposition, Justice Barrett argues that “the ‘corrupt’ element must weed out innocent activists and lobbyists who are engaged in lawful activity.” Perhaps that argument could work under Justice Walker’s definition, but the D.C. Circuit holds that “corruptly” means “using unlawful means” or “acting with an unlawful purpose.” In other words, badWhy does this broad definition blind protesters? Barrett doesn’t explain.
Judge Barrett also wrote that “defendants may raise First Amendment objections as applied.” Really? Just a week ago, Justice Barrett joined Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion. RahimiI rejected everything that was applied in the context of the Second Amendment. I wrote about this issue. here. Since then I have found this area of law to be very unclear. Simply put, in a motion to dismiss a criminal charge, a defendant who argues that the statute is unconstitutional under the First or Second Amendment Only It poses a challenge to your face. (For challenges based on the doctrine of enumerated powers, the standards seem to be different. Lopez.) As a result, Salerno The standard applies, and the defendant must prove that the statute is unconstitutional. every regards. Broad principles may come into play (if such principles still exist), but objections to their application are not allowed in motions to dismiss indictments. Now, if Judge Barrett thinks the challenge applied could work on a First Amendment challenge, she can take another look. Rahimi.
During this period, the court also had the opportunity to address bribery and “corrupt” behavior. Snyder vs. United States. This case drew a line between bribery and kickbacks. In dissent, Justice Jackson wrote that it does not matter what “corruption” means in this case.
Again, the exact meaning of the term “corruptly” is not the question before us today. Whatever “corruption” means, it doesn't really matter here, as Snyder's actions clearly fit the bill and this case is not a good way to explore the contours of that term.
Jackson also quoted: Arthur Anderson To conclude that corruption involves “consciousness of wrongdoing” would be analogous to “knowing” mens rea or something like that. In other words, “prosecutors must not only find that state, local, or tribal officials actually acted wrongly when accepting gifts or payments; I get it It was wrong to accept a gift or payment.” Isn't “corruptly” any different from “knowing” that what you are doing is wrong or illegal? Could that be right? Or does corruption still have no morality or sense of malice? Does Justice Jackson's dissent leave much unexplained (Jackson's argument)? Fisher The motion did not even attempt to define “corruptly.”)
~ inside snyderJustice Kavanaugh's majority opinion sought to shed some light on this term.
Federal and state law distinguish between two types of payments to public officials: bribes and gratuities. Generally, a bribe is a payment or agreement made prior to an official act in order to influence the official to perform the official act in the future. U.S. law generally regards bribes as inherently corrupt and illegal. . . .
As these examples show, a bribe after an official act is not the same as a bribe before an official act. Ultimately, a bribe, unlike a bribe, can corrupt an official act. That is, an official acts for personal gain rather than for the public good.
What makes a bribe “corrupt” is not the order, but the payment. before an official act; that much quid before quo. What makes bribery corrupt is the performance of an official act in exchange for personal gain. Once again, I would like to point out Judge Walker's definition of “corrupt” in the proceedings below.[s] ‘With intent to obtain unlawful advantage for oneself or another person’
At the time of the first Trump impeachment, Seth Barrett Tillman and I explained: It is important to separate public servants' “personal” interests from their public interest in society. The two are often difficult to separate. However, if a public official performs an official act in exchange for another public official performing the official act, it is neither bribery nor is he acting “corruptly.” Instead, there is a political compromise. Any attempt to criminalize such behavior is to criminalize politics.